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1 INTRODUCTION
From an engineering standpoint the design of complex
distributed systems based upon the swarm intelligence
paradigm is compellingly attractive but problematical. A
distinguishing characteristic of distributed systems based
upon swarm intelligence is that they have no hierar-
1http://www.ias.uwe.ac.uk/
chical command and control structure, and hence no
common mode failure point or vulnerability. Inspired
by social insects, individual agents make decisions au-
tonomously, based upon local sensing and communica-
tions, see Bonabeau et al, 1999 (3) and 2000 (4). Systems
with these characteristics could, potentially, exhibit very
high levels of robustness, in the sense of tolerance to fail-
ure of individual agents; much higher levels of robustness
Copyright c© 200x Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
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than in complex distributed systems based on traditional
design approaches. However, that robustness comes at a
price. Complex systems with swarm intelligence might be
difficult to control or mediate if they started to exhibit un-
expected behaviours. Such systems would therefore need
to be designed and validated for a high level of assurance
that they exhibit intended behaviours and equally impor-
tantly do not exhibit unintended behaviours. It seems rea-
sonable to assert that future engineered systems based on
the swarm intelligence paradigm would need to be subject
to processes of design, analysis and test no less demand-
ing that those we expect for current complex distributed
systems.
Some might argue that a ‘dependable swarm’ is an oxy-
moron; that the swarm intelligence paradigm is intrinsi-
cally unsuitable for application in engineered systems that
require a high level of integrity. The idea that overall de-
sired swarm behaviours are not explicitly coded anywhere
in the system, but are instead an emergent consequence of
the interaction of individual agents with each other and
their environment, might appear to be especially problem-
atical from a dependability perspective. In a previous pa-
per (16) we argued that this is not so: that systems which
employ emergence should, in principle, be no more difficult
to validate than conventional complex systems and, indeed,
that a number of characteristics of swarm intelligence are
highly desirable from a dependability perspective. In that
paper we introduced the notion of a ‘dependable swarm’,
that is a robotic swarm engineered to high standards of de-
sign, analysis and test, and therefore able to exhibit high
levels of safety and reliability; hence ‘swarm engineering’.
That paper concluded that while some of the tools needed
to assure a swarm for dependability exist, most do not, and
set out a roadmap of the work that needs to be done before
safety-critical swarms become an engineering reality. The
present paper is part of that roadmap.
Probably the most challenging task in dependability as-
surance, see Anderson et al (1), is proving the safety of
a system. Formally ‘safety’ is defined as the property of
not exhibiting undesirable behaviours or, to put it more
simply, not doing the wrong thing. In order to establish
this property first requires that we identify and articulate
all possible undesirable behaviours. This is called ‘hazard
analysis’. It is problematical with conventional complex
systems, and there is no reason to suppose that identify-
ing the hazards in swarm engineered systems will be any
different. Hazards analysis is difficult because there are no
formal methods for identifying hazards. It simply has to
be done by inspection, typically by ‘extreme brainstorm-
ing’ to try and list all possible hazards (no matter how
seemingly implausible or improbable).
Given a reasonably well understood operational envi-
ronment there are two reasons for undesirable behaviours:
random errors, or systematic (design) errors. Random er-
rors are those due to hardware or component faults, and
these are typically analysed using techniques such as Fail-
ure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), see Dailey (5).
The likelihood that random errors cause undesirable be-
haviours can be reduced, in the first instance, by employing
high reliability components. But systems that require high
dependability will typically also need to be fault tolerant,
through redundancy for example. This is an important
point since swarm engineered systems should, in this re-
spect, offer very significant advantages over conventional
complex systems. Two characteristics of swarms work in
our favour here. Firstly, simple agents with relatively few
rules lend themselves to FMEA, and their simplicity fa-
cilitates design for reliability. Secondly, swarms consist of
multiple robots and hence by definition exhibit high lev-
els of redundancy and tolerance to failure of individual
agents. Indeed, robot swarms may go far beyond conven-
tional notions of fault tolerance by exhibiting tolerance to
individuals who actively thwart the overall desired swarm
behaviour. It is the purpose of this paper to explore, by
means of a case study, fault tolerance (to random errors)
in robot swarms through hazards analysis, FMEA and re-
liability modelling.
Systematic errors are those aspects of the design that
could allow the system to exhibit undesirable behaviours.
For swarm engineered systems analysis of systematic errors
clearly needs to take place at two levels: in the individual
agent and for the swarm as a whole. Analysis of system-
atic errors in the individual agent should be helped by the
relative simplicity of the agents, but is not trivial. Analy-
sis of systematic errors for the swarm as a whole is much
more problematical, particularly if the desired behaviours
are emergent. However, in (17) we explore the use of the
Temporal Logic formalism for specification and possibly
proof of correctness of emergent behaviours.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces
the case study that will be used to illustrate and under-
pin the work of the paper, then introduces the concept
of robustness in the context of swarm robotics. Section 3
uses the methodology of Failure Mode and Effect Analy-
sis (FMEA) to investigate the fault tolerance of our case
study robot swarm. First, we identify all possible hazard
(fault) conditions, then analyse the effect (and severity) of
such faults occuring in one or more robots of the swarm.
Section 4 outlines and discusses a number of possible relia-
bility modelling approaches that could be applied to swarm
robotics. Finally in section 5 the paper draws general con-
clusions, discusses the findings of this work and proposes
future work to improve models of fault tolerance in robot
swarms.
2 CASE STUDY: SWARM CONTAINMENT
As a case study let us consider a swarm robotics approach
to physical containment or encapsulation, as illustrated in
figure 1.
Potential applications for such an approach might in-
clude a swarm of marine robots that find and then con-
tain oil pollution or in-vivo nano-bots that seek and iso-
late harmful cells in the blood stream (a kind of artificial
phagocyte). The latter application is not so far-fetched
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Figure 1: Encapsulation: (l) in progress and (r) complete
when one considers the rate of progress in the engineering
of genetic circuits, see for example Yokobayashi et al, 2003
(18).
The emergent encapsulation behaviour of figure 1 is one
of a number of emergent properties of a class of algorithms
that we have developed, which make use of local wireless
connectivity information alone to achieve swarm aggrega-
tion; see Nembrini et al, 2002 (13) and Nembrini 2004 (14).
Wireless connectivity is linked to robot motion so that
robots within the swarm are wirelessly ‘glued’ together.
This approach has several advantages: firstly the robots
need neither absolute or relative positional information;
secondly the swarm is able to maintain aggregation (i.e.
stay together) even in unbounded space, and thirdly, the
connectivity needed for and generated by the algorithm
means that the swarm naturally forms an ad hoc commu-
nications network. Such a network would be a requirement
in many swarm robotics applications. The algorithm re-
quires that connectivity information is transmitted only a
single hop. Each robot broadcasts its ID and the IDs of its
immediate neighbours only, and since the maximum num-
ber of neighbours a real robot can have is physically con-
strained and the same for a swarm of 100 or 10,000 robots,
the algorithm scales linearly for increasing swarm size. The
algorithm thus meets the criteria for swarm robotics, ar-
ticulated by S¸ahin, 2005 (15) and Beni, 2005 (2). We have
(we contend) a highly robust and scalable swarm of ho-
mogeneous and relatively incapable robots with only local
sensing and communication capabilities, in which the re-
quired swarm behaviours are truly emergent.
The lowest level swarm behaviour is ‘coherence’ which,
in summary, works as follows. Each robot has range-
limited wireless communication and, while moving, peri-
odically broadcasts an ‘I am here’ message (which also
contains the IDs of its neighbours). The message will of
course be received only by those robots that are within
wireless range. If a robot loses a connection to robot r and
the number of its remaining neighbours still connected to
r is less than or equal to the threshold β then it assumes
it is moving out of the swarm and will execute a 180◦
turn. When the number of connections rises (i.e. when
the swarm is regained) the robot chooses a new direction
Figure 2: Laboratory Linuxbots
at random. We say that the swarm is coherent if any break
in its overall connectivity lasts less than a given time con-
stant C. Coherence gives rise to the two emergent be-
haviours of swarm aggregation and a (coherent) connected
ad hoc wireless network. Each robot also has short-range
avoidance sensors and a long-range beacon sensor. When
a robot senses the beacon it sets its β threshold to ∞ (the
normal value of β is low, typically 2 or 3). This creates
a differential motion in the swarm and gives rise to the
emergent beacon taxis behaviour. Swarm obstacle avoid-
ance and beacon encapsulation behaviours follow naturally.
Table 1 summarises the complete set of emergent swarm
behaviours.
Case Study Swarm Behaviours
1 Swarm aggregation
2 Coherent ad hoc network
3 Beacon taxis
4 Obstacle avoidance
5 Beacon encapsulation
Table 1: Summary of Emergent Swarm Behaviours
Our algorithms for coherent swarming of wireless net-
worked mobile robots have been tested extensively in sim-
ulation and, rather less extensively, using a fleet of physical
laboratory robots. A group of these robots (Linuxbots) are
shown in figure 2. The real robot implementation does not,
however, constitute a real-world application. It is instead
an ‘embodied’ simulation, shown in figure 3, whose main
purpose is to verify that algorithms tested in computer
simulation will transfer to the real world of non-ideal and
noisy sensors and actuators.
2.1 Robustness and task completion
In the swarm intelligence literature, robustness sometimes
refers to the simplicity and hence functional and mechani-
cal reliability of the simple, even minimalist robots that
comprise a swarm, Melhuish 2001, (11). Sometimes it
refers to the ability of the swarm to cope with a demand-
ing operational environment, Mondada et al 2002, (12),
but most often robustness refers to the swarm’s tolerance
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Figure 3: A Linuxbot Embodied Simulation
to the failure of one or more individual robots, Kazadi et
al 2004, (8). Actually, this lack of precision about what
is meant by robustness is understandable when we con-
sider that a multi-robot system built upon the principles
of swarm intelligence may well exhibit all of these forms of
robustness, and more.
We could say that a robot swarm is robust because:
1. it is a completely distributed system and therefore has
no common-mode failure point;
2. it is comprised of simple and hence functionally and
mechanically reliable individual robots;
3. it may be tolerant to noise and uncertainties in the
operational environment;
4. it may be tolerant to the failure of one or more robots
without compromising2 the desired overall swarm be-
haviours, and
5. it may be tolerant to individual robots who fail in
such a way as to thwart the overall desired swarm
behaviour.
When we speak of failure of the swarm to achieve the
desired overall swarm behaviour we need to ask ”failure
to do what, exactly?”. One of the defining characteristics
of robotic swarms is that task completion is hard to pin
down for two reasons. Firstly, because task completion is
generally only in the eye of the beholder; the robots them-
selves often cannot know when the task is complete either
because their simplicity precludes the sensing or compu-
tational mechanisms to detect the condition of task com-
pletion or because their limited localised sensing means
they cannot see enough of the environment to be able to
get the big picture (or both). In the case of puck clus-
tering, for instance, robots that are left to run after they
have done their work may even, in time, disturb and un-
cluster the pucks, only to then form them in a different
place (11). Secondly, in swarm robotics, task completion
2although the desired swarm behaviours might well be delayed or
impaired in some way.
is often defined by some statistical measure rather than
a hard determined outcome. In considering the object en-
capsulation of figure 1, for instance, the swarm would need
to reach an acceptable threshold of density of robots uni-
formly surrounding the target object (beacon).
3 ANALYSIS OF SWARM FAILURE
In this section we undertake a Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (FMEA) for our case study of a wireless con-
nected robot swarm. The methodology is straightforward,
see Dailey (5). We attempt to identify all of the possi-
ble hazards, which could be faults in robots or robot sub-
systems (internal hazards), or environmental disturbances
(external hazards). Then, in each case, we analyse the ef-
fect of the hazard on each of the overall swarm behaviours.
Thus, we build up a picture of the tolerance of the swarm
to both types of hazard and begin to understand which
hazards are the most serious in terms of compromising the
overall desired swarm behaviours. FMEA is, at this stage,
essentially qualitative. In this paper we consider only in-
ternal hazards. External hazards (i.e. communications
noise) were investigated in Nembrini, 2004 (14).
First we identify the internal hazards. In keeping with
the swarm intelligence paradigm our robot swarm contains
no system-wide components or structures, thus the only
internal hazards that can occur are faults in individual
robots. Since, in our case, the robots of the swarm are all
identical, then (internal) hazards analysis requires us to
consider only the faults that could occur in one or more
individual robots, and then consider their effect on the
overall swarm behaviours. Table 2 identifies the fault con-
ditions for an individual robot.
Hazard Description
H1 Motor failure
H2 Communications failure
H3 Avoidance sensor(s) failure
H4 Beacon sensor failure
H5 Control systems failure
H6 All systems failure
Table 2: Internal hazards for a single robot
Table 2 makes the assumption that failures of robot sub-
systems can occur independently. This is a reasonable
assumption, given that our mobile robots are in reality
an assembly of complex but relatively self-contained sub-
systems. Hazard H1 motor failure, covers the possibility
of mechanical or motion-controller failure in one or both of
the motors in our differential drive mobile robot, such that
the robot is either unable to move at all or can only turn
on the spot (which from an overall swarm point of view
amounts to the same thing). Hazard H2 represents a fail-
ure of the robot’s wireless network communication system
such that the robot is unable to receive or transmit mes-
sages. Hazards H3 and H4 represent failure of the robot’s
avoidance and beacon sensors respectively; the former will
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render the robot incapable of detecting and hence avoiding
robots or environmental obstacles, the latter means that
the robot cannot sense the target beacon, i.e. the object
to be encapsulated. Hazard H5 represents a failure of the
robot’s control system (typically implemented in software).
Finally hazard H6 represents a total failure of the robot;
failure of the robot’s power supply would, for instance,
bring about this terminal condition.
Let us now consider the effects of each the hazards enu-
merated above on the overall swarm behaviours. We will
consider here the effect on the overall swarm of the hazard
occuring in one or a small number of the individuals in
the swarm. Of course the question of how many is a small
number in this context is important, and later in the paper
we will refer again to the question of what proportion of
robots need to fail in order to seriously compromise the
desired overall swarm behaviours. Simulation studies sug-
gest we can (very conservatively) estimate a small number
here as under 5% of the swarm. Those studies also show
that a higher proportion of failures can still be tolerated.
3.1 Hazard H1: motor failure
The effect of motor failure in a single robot, or small
number of robots, is interesting. Robot(s) with fault
H1 become - in effect - stationary but, given that their
wireless communication and other electronic systems
continue to function, they remain within the wireless ad
hoc network of the swarm. These robots continue to fully
contribute to the swarm aggregation and ad hoc network
emergent behaviours. It is only when the swarm needs to
physically translate its position. i.e. for the beacon taxis,
obstacle avoidance and beacon encapsulation behaviours,
that hazard H1 becomes a serious problem. In these cases
robots with motor failure will have the effect of physically
anchoring the swarm, either impeding or, at worst,
actually preventing the swarm from moving toward its
target3. This is a potentially serious hazard since one or a
small number of robots with motor failure could seriously
compromise our top-level desired ‘beacon encapsulation’
behaviour. We shall label this fault effect as E1, with an
upper-case E to denote that it is potentially serious.
Effect E1: Motor failure anchoring the swarm
3.2 Hazard H2: communications failure
Failure of the network communications sub-system in one
or a small number of mobile robots means that those
robots become disconnected from the swarm. Given that
the basic swarm aggregation mechanism depends upon
wireless network communication, then robots with fault
H2 will become physically lost to the swarm and will
wander off at random. As far as the swarm is concerned
these robots simply become (moving) obstacles to be
3Simulation studies suggest that swarm taxis ‘pull’ can overcome
the anchoring force, in some cases. This phenomenon needs further
investigation
avoided. The overall swarm behaviours are, however,
essentially unaffected. This hazard has, therefore, a
relatively benign effect, except of course that the failed
robots remain mobile within the environment and - in
some circumstances - this may be undesirable. We label
this effect e2, with a lower-case e to denote that it is a
non-serious fault.
Effect e2: Lost robot(s) loose in the environment
3.3 Hazard H3: avoidance sensor failure
Failure of the avoidance sensor(s) in one or a small number
of robots has little effect on overall swarm behaviour. A
single robot with failed avoidance sensors will be avoided
by the other robots in the swarm and hence have no overall
effect. In the unlikely event that two or more robots
with failed avoidance sensors collide with each other then
physical damage might result from such collisions, but
the overall swarm behaviours remain unaffected. It is
only when we consider overall swarm behaviours: obstacle
avoidance and beacon encapsulation that hazard H3
becomes a potential problem. Clearly, in these cases, the
robots with failed avoidance sensors could collide with
either static obstacles in the environment or with the bea-
con (target). Although not serious this effect might be a
problem in some circumstances, we thus label this effect e3.
Effect e3: Robot collisions with obstacles or target.
3.4 Hazard H4: beacon sensor failure
Failure of the beacon sensor in one or a small number of
robots has a practically undetectable effect on the overall
swarm behaviour. This is because the emergent beacon
taxis behaviour results from a differential motion between
that part of the swarm whose robots can ‘see’ the beacon,
and the rest of the swarm that cannot (see Nembrini (14)
for a detailed explanation of this mechanism). Since this
differential is created between two substantive parts of the
swarm, the effect of one or a small number of robots with
failed beacon sensors is negligible. At worst we might ob-
serve a slight slow-down in the swarm taxis behaviour, but
this is not judged sufficient to merit labelling as a fault
effect.
3.5 Hazard H5: control systems failure
A control systems failure in one or a small number of robots
is very difficult to characterise in terms of its effect on over-
all swarm behaviour. However, there is every reason to
suppose that the likelihood of a failed control system will
not seriously compromise the overall swarm behaviours.
This is because the control software is very simple; each
robot has three behavioural layers: ‘forward’ (the default
behaviour), ‘avoidance’ (triggered by the avoidance sen-
sors), and ‘coherence’ (as defined in section 2). Figure 4
shows the control system Finite State Machine (FSM). A
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Figure 4: Controller Finite State Machine
control systems failure, if it occurs at all, is most likely to
manifest itself as incorrect motor actions. Consider the
case that a control systems failure means that the the
robot is stuck in its default (forward) behaviour regard-
less of sensors or network communications; this robot will
quickly leave the swarm and be lost in the environment
(effect e2). Its effect on the swarm will be transient and
can therefore be ignored in this analysis. A more serious
situation would be a control system failure that leaves the
robot either stationary or turning on the spot, i.e. effect
E1. This is unlikely, given that the default behaviour is for-
ward, but - to be cautious - let us assume the possibility of
this worst case hazard. Logically, E1 will only compromise
beacon taxis and higher order swarm behaviours, thus con-
trol systems failure could result (worst case) in e2 during
aggregation and ad hoc network behaviours or E1 during
all others.
3.6 Hazard H6: total systems failure
Complete failure of one or a small number of robots
caused, for instance, by power failure will clearly render
the robot(s) stationary and inactive. They will be wire-
lessly disconnected from the swarm and will be treated,
by the swarm, as static obstacles to be avoided. Ironically,
given that this is the most serious failure at the level of
an individual robot, it is the most benign as far as the
overall swarm is concerned. Apart from the loss of the
failed robots from the swarm, none of the overall swarm
behaviours are compromised by this hazard. It is, in fact,
the least serious hazard.
To summarise this section, table 3 shows the swarm
fault effects, as defined above, generated by one or a
small number of robots with hazards H1...H6, for each
of the five emergent swarm behaviours defined in section
2. Table 3 clearly shows that the serious swarm failure
effect E1 only occurs in 6 out of 30 possible combinations
of robot hazard and swarm behaviour. 15 out of the 30
hazard scenarios have no effect at all on swarm behaviour,
and the remaining 9 have only minor, non-serious, effects.
Swarm Behaviour H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6
Aggregation - e2 - - e2 -
Ad hoc network - e2 - - e2 -
Beacon taxis E1 e2 - - E1 -
Obstacle avoidance E1 e2 e3 - E1 -
Encapsulation E1 e2 e3 - E1 -
Table 3: Summary of Failure Modes and Effects
4 SWARM RELIABILITY MODELLING
In this section we explore a number of possible reliabil-
ity models for a robot swarm. The purpose of a reliability
model is to enable the estimation of overall system reliabil-
ity, given the (known) reliability of individual components
of the system, see Elsayed (6). Reliability R is defined as
the probability that the system will operate without fail-
ure, thus the unreliability (probability of failure) of the
system, Pf = 1− R. In our case the overall system is the
robot swarm and its components are the individual robots
of the swarm.
From a reliability modelling perspective a swarm of
robots is clearly a parallel system of N components
(robots). If the robots are independent, with equal proba-
bility of failure p, then the system probability of failure is
clearly the product of robot probabilities of failure. Thus,
for identical robots,
R = 1− pN (1)
p can be estimated using a classical reliability block dia-
gram approach on the individual sub-systems of the robot.
Since the individual robot does not internally employ par-
allelism or redundancy then its reliability will be modelled
as a series system, giving p less than the worst sub-system
in the robot, which is likely to be its motor drive system
(refer to hazard H1 in the previous section).
However, this simplistic modelling approach makes a se-
rious and incorrect assumption, which is that the over-
all system remains fully operational if as few as one of
its components remains operational. This is certainly not
true of our case study wireless connected swarm. The de-
sired emergent swarm behaviours require the interaction
of multiple robots; our swarm beacon taxis behaviour is a
dramatic example: with one robot only the behaviour sim-
ply cannot emerge. It is a general charactersitic of swarm
robotic systems that the desired overall swarm behaviours
are not manifest with just one or a very small number
of robots. However, the question of how many (or few)
robots are needed in order to guarantee a required emer-
gent behaviour in a particular swarm and for a particular
behaviour is often not straightforward.
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4.1 A load-sharing approach
This leads us to suggest that a robot swarm should be
reliability-modelled as a parallel load-sharing system since,
in a sense, the overall workload of the swarm is shared be-
tween its members. A reliability model of a parallel load-
sharing system takes the approach that if one component
fails then the probability of failure of the remaining N − 1
components increases; if a second component fails then the
probability of the remaining N−2 failing further increases,
and so on; see Lee et al (9). While such a model is certainly
appropriate for conventional load-sharing systems (think of
a 4 engined aircraft with one failed engine, flying on its re-
maining 3 engines), its applicability is arguable in the case
of a robot swarm. Consider our case study. The failure of
one or more robots does not intrinsically increase the work-
load - and hence reduce the reliability - of the remaining,
operational, robots. Only in the limited sense that failed
robots might increase the task completion (beacon encap-
sulation) time of the remaining robots might there be an
impact on reliability, in that the remaining robots are op-
erational for a longer time. In a robot swarm that does
perform work, for example sorting or manipulating physi-
cal objects, as in Martinoli et al 2004 (10), then it may be
the case that the failure of one or more robots does increase
the workload on the remaining robots; in these cases the
load-sharing reliability model may be applicable.
4.2 A multi-state approach
Finally let us consider a multi-state approach. The FMEA
analysis of the previous section showed that individual
robots are not always either fully functioning or completely
failed, but could be in one of a number of hazard states
that we labelled as H1...H6. States H1...H5 correspond to
partial failure states, state H6 is completely failed. The
FMEA revealed that the most critical hazard state is H1,
giving rise to swarm failure effect E1: robot(s) with motor
failure ‘anchoring’ the swarm. (Hazard state H5 we argued
was, in some conditions, equivalent.) Thus, from a relia-
bility point-of-view let us make the simplifying assumption
that robots are in one of three states: fully operational,
state H1 or state H6 completely failed.
If the probability of failure of a robot in state H1, p1 =
P (H1) and the probability of failure in state H6 is p6 =
P (H6), then clearly the reliability of one robot r = 1 −
p1 − p6. For N robots in the swarm, the reliability of the
swarm could be modelled as,
R = (1− p1)N − pN6 (2)
In fact plotting equation 2 for a range of values of N
interestingly gives us an optimum value for swarm size in
order to maximise the swarm reliability. It is trivial to find
the optimum N for given values of p1 and p6 by taking the
derivative of equation 2 with respect to N and equating to
0 (see (6)). Clearly we expect p1 ¿ p6, but this analysis
does give surprisingly low ‘optimum’ values for swarm size
N . For example if p6 = 0.1 (which is rather unreliable) and
p1 = 0.001 we find the optimum swarm size is between 3
and 4 robots!
Although this may appear to be a meaningless result,
it does tell us, firstly, that with the rather larger swarm
sizes that we need in order to bring about the desired
emergent swarm behaviours we are operating with a sub-
optimal swarm size in terms of reliability. Secondly, and
perhaps more importantly, this analysis strengthens the
conclusion of the FMEA of the previous section, that we
need to endeavour to minimise, or ameliorate, the likeli-
hood of hazard H1.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This paper has explored fault tolerance in robot swarms by
means of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and
reliability modelling. One overall conclusion of this paper
is that robot swarms do indeed merit the general charac-
terisation of ‘robust’, although not just because of their
inherent parallelism and redundancy. The high level of ro-
bustness is a result of several factors: parallelism of mul-
tiple robots; redundancy characterised by a sub-optimal
approach to the desired overall swarm functionality (in
common with the natural systems from which swarm in-
telligence takes its inspiration); the fully distributed ap-
proach with no ‘system-wide’ vulnerability to hazards; the
functional simplicity of individual robots, and the swarm’s
unusual tolerance to failure in individual robots. It is use-
ful to reflect on the fact that this level of fault-tolerance
comes for free with the swarm intelligence paradigm, that
is, without special efforts to achieve fault tolerance by the
designer. Contrast this with conventional complex dis-
tributed systems that require considerable design effort in
order to achieve fault tolerance.
The FMEA case study of this paper has showed that our
robot swarm is remarkably tolerant to the complete failure
of robot(s) but - perhaps counter-intuitively - is less toler-
ant to partially failed robots. For the swarm of our case
study a robot with failed motors, but all other sub-systems
functioning, can have the effect of anchoring the swarm
and hindering or preventing swarm motion (taxis toward
the target). This leads us to two conclusions (1) analy-
sis of fault tolerance in swarms critically needs to consider
the consequence of partial robot failures, and (2) future
safety-critical swarms would need designed-in measures to
counter the effect of such partial failures. For example, we
could envisage a new robot behaviour that identifies neigh-
bours who have partial failure, then ‘isolates’ those robots
from the rest of the swarm: a kind of built-in immune
response to failed robots.
Furthermore, we have demonstrated that FMEA is a
valuable methodology for swarm robotics systems, and
that the use of the swarm intelligence paradigm simplifies
FMEA considerably.
This paper’s study of reliability models is perhaps less
conclusive. The most interesting conclusion is that a
multi-state reliability model is needed in order to account
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for the partially failed robots identified by FMEA. We
have shown that a multi-state reliability model can have
interesting implications for optimum swarm size (from a
reliability perspective), although this finding comes with
a clear health warning. Further work is clearly needed
to study reliability models for swarm systems including,
for instance, study of the k-out-of-n reliability model, in
which k would be the minimum number of robots needed
for acceptable overall swarm functionality, although how
we would determine k in this context is by no means clear.
Further work should also investigate combined multi-state
k-out-of-n reliability approaches, as in Huang et al, 2000
(7).
In summary, future work should include:
• the study of more quantitative measures of robustness
and fault tolerance in robotic swarms;
• the extension of this work to other swarm system case
studies in an effort to generalise the approach;
• the development of increased fault tolerance in robot
swarms based on an auto immune-response model,
and
• further study of reliability models for swarm robotic
systems.
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